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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). (R. 410,458). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate this appeal, given that 
the appeal filed by Appellants J.J. Hunan, Inc. d/b/a J.J. Hunan Sum Fun Food 
("Hunan") and R. Alan Knox ("Knox") (collectively, "Appellants") in this 
unlawful detainer action was not filed within ten days of entry of judgment, as 
required by under Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
Issues surrounding appellate jurisdiction and timeliness of appeal are not issues that the 
district court ever passes upon, and therefore there is no "standard of review." This Court 
must determine for itself, essentially de novo, whether it has jurisdiction to entertain this 
appeal. This Court instructed the parties to address this issue in their opening briefs. 
2. Whether the district court's legal conclusions 4,7, and 6-8 are correct, in which 
the district court concluded that Plaintiff/Appellee Red Cliffs Corner, L.L.C. 
("RCC") had the right to terminate the Lease after Hunan failed to pay its rent 
timely for three consecutive months. 
A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for 
correctness, see Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), although 
the district court's findings of fact upon which such conclusions are based are reviewed only 
after Appellants have marshaled the evidence in support of those findings and, following the 
marshaling, demonstrated that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings, id.; 
see also Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177. Where "the appellant fails to 
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marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the 
trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case" "to the facts as found" by the lower court. See 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). RCC does not dispute that Appellants 
properly preserved this issue below. 
3. Whether the district court's legal conclusions 10-13 are correct, in which the 
district court concluded (i) that Hunan became a tenant at will when it refused 
to vacate the premises after receiving RCC's written notice, and (ii) that RCC 
complied with the provisions of Utah's tenant-at-will statute. 
A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for 
correctness, see Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d at 941, although the district court's findings of fact upon 
which such conclusions are based are reviewed only after Appellants have marshaled the 
evidence in support of those findings and, following the marshaling, demonstrated that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings, id.; see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, f76. 
Where "the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case" "to the facts as found" 
by the lower court. See Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199. RCC does not dispute that Appellants 
properly preserved this issue below. 
4. Whether the district court's legal conclusions 14-15 are correct, in which the 
district court concluded that RCC was entitled to damages for unlawful detainer. 
A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for 
correctness, see Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d at 941, although the district court's findings of fact upon 
which such conclusions are based are reviewed only after Appellants have marshaled the 
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evidence in support of those findings and, following the marshaling, demonstrated that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the Findings, id.; see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, %J6. 
Where "the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case'5 "to the facts as found" 
by the lower court. See Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199. RCC does not dispute that Appellants 
properly preserved this issue below. 
5. Whether the district court's legal conclusions 30-45 are correct, in which the 
district court concluded that Appellants had waived their right to claim that RCC 
breached the Lease. 
A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for 
correctness, see Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d at 941, although the district court's findings of fact upon 
which such conclusions are based are reviewed only after Appellants have marshaled the 
evidence in support of those findings and, following the marshaling, demonstrated that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings, id.; see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, f76. 
Where "the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case" "to the facts as found" 
by the lower court. See Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199 (Utah 1991). With regard to waiver, the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "waiver presents mixed questions of law and fact" and that 
"whether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question 
which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are 
factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations." Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^23. 
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RCC does not dispute that Appellants properly preserved this issue below. 
6. Whether the district court properly exercised its discretion to deny Appellants' 
request to amend their counterclaim. 
A district court's denial of a motion to amend pleadings is reviewed only for "abuse of 
discretion resulting in prejudice." See Berkshires, LLC v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 536, Ijl 1,127 
P.3d 1243. RCC does not dispute that Appellants properly preserved this issue below. 
7. Whether the district court erred in refusing to award RCC its attorneys5 fees as 
part of the judgment below. 
The district court's decision to grant or deny attorneys' fees when attorneys' fees are 
called for in the contract and are mandated by statute is an issue of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,990-91 (Utah 1988). This issue was preserved in 
the district court by motion. (R. 389 (RCC's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact); R. 393 
(opposition memorandum); R. 397 (reply memo.); R. 402 (order denying motion)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
RCC believes that interpretation of the following statutes and rules may be 
determinative of portions of this appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802 (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
3): (1) "A tenant holding real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an 
unlawful detainer;... (b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite 
time with monthly or periodic rent reserved;. . . (ii) in cases of tenancies at 
will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a 
notice of not less than five calendar days." 
• Utah R. App. P. 4(a): " . . . However, when a judgment or order is entered in 
a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an unlawful detainer case wherein RCC, as the landlord, evicted Hunan from 
the leased premises for breach of the lease agreement between the parties. Hunan breached 
the lease several times and to such an extent that it gave rise to RCC's right to forfeit 
Hunan's leasehold. Because Hunan's leasehold right had been forfeited, Hunan became a 
tenant at will. RCC evicted Hunan for unlawful detainer in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-6-802(l)(a)(ii). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 2003, RCC began work to build a new building in the available parking lot space 
at the Zion Factory Stores in St. George, Utah. This building was intended to house a 
Starbucks and some type of restaurant. (R. 341 j^f 4-7; TT 18:21-19:6). Based on its own 
analysis of the local market, RCC determined that the restaurant should carry either Asian 
or Mexican food and initially determined it would focus on bringing in a restaurant carrying 
Asian food. Id. RCC became aware of an Asian restaurant called J.J. Hunan Sum Fun 
Food, which was a d/b/a for Hunan, which was owned in part by Knox. In the late spring of 
2003, RCC opened discussions with Hunan regarding Hunan's ability to be the restaurant 
next to the Starbucks. (R. 341 ffi[ 6-7; TT 19:7-17). 
From approximately June through October 2003, RCC and Hunan negotiated the 
terms of a written lease agreement ("Lease"). Hunan requested a number of changes to 
RCC's proposed lease agreement, including a request that rent be due on the tenth of the 
month instead of the first of the month. (R. 341 U 7 - R. 342 1J 9; TT 20:2 - 21:18). In 
addition to negotiating the terms for the lease agreement with Hunan, RCC required Knox, 
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the principal owner of Hunan, to enter a personal guaranty to guarantee all performance and 
indebtedness of Hunan. (R. 342 f^t} 10-11; TT 21:25-22:5). During the negotiations of the 
Lease terms, RCC reminded Hunan that the construction of the building was scheduled to 
be ready for Hunan's possession by July 1,2004. (R. 343 Tf 15; TT 23:17-23). 
By November 21, 2003, the parties had agreed on all of the final lease terms and 
conditions and executed the Lease. (R. 342 ^ 9; TT 21:19-24). The Lease set forth certain 
terms for construction for RCC to complete ("Landlord's Work") and improvements Hunan 
would make ("Tenant Improvements"). Because construction had to occur quickly, the Lease 
required that Hunan deliver two sets of plans showing Tenant Improvements to RCC within 
thirty (30) days of signing the Lease or, in other words, by December 21, 2003. (R. 343 
[^ 17). RCC needed these plans quickly to review and approve because RCC was 
constructing a new building and would need Hunan's plans to determine where to stub 
utilities. (R. 343 1f 18 and R. 344 ^ 20). However, Hunan did not provide Tenant 
Improvement plans to RCC by the December 21 deadline. In fact, Hunan did not provide its 
plans at any time prior to taking physical possession of the space it agreed in the Lease to 
occupy ("Premises") in September 2004. (R. 344 f 21; TT 253:13-23). Without Hunan's 
plans and specifications, RCC did not know where Hunan intended to place sinks, outlets, 
etc. Therefore, RCC stubbed in the plumbing and electrical in a somewhat standard manner. 
(R. 344 H 22; TT 41:5-8; 42:20-24; 91:19-25). 
RCC hired Watts Construction to construct the entire new building, including all 
Landlord's Work. (R. 3441f 23; TT 45:1-6). RCC did observe the progress of construction 
and made reports to Hunan that RCC was on target for delivery of possession of the Premises 
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to Hunan by July 1,2004. (R. 345 U 24; TT 24:2-15). Once Watts Construction confirmed 
that its work would be completed by July 1, 2004, RCC prepared a Notice of Tender, which 
was required under the terms of the Lease. (R. 345 f 25; TT 25:9-17). The purposes of the 
Notice of Tender were (i) to notify Hunan that it could begin Tenant Improvements; (ii) to 
trigger Hunan's obligation to commence Tenant Improvements, which Hunan had to 
complete within ninety (90) days of the Notice of Tender (R. 345 ^ | 26); and (iii) give notice 
that rent would commence on the earlier of ninety (90) days or actual opening of Hunan's 
business in the Premises. (R. 345 ffl[ 25-26; TT 25:18-25). 
The Notice of Tender also triggered a thirty (30) day time period for Hunan to inspect 
the Premises prior to taking possession and to give RCC a punchlist of any items that needed 
to be completed before Hunan took possession. (R. 345 ^ J 27; TT 26:6-12). Hunan sent its 
contractor to inspect the Premises during the first week of July 2004. (R. 345 1J 28; TT 
234:16-24). Although Hunan had completed its inspection of the Premises, it did not prepare 
or provide a punchlist to RCC, nor did Hunan otherwise object to any aspect of Landlord's 
Work during the thirty (30) day period provided for in the Lease. (R. 345 ffij 28-29; R.346 
ffi[ 30-32; TT 26:13-23). Hunan did not start Tenant Improvements during July 2004, and 
RCC became worried about this lack of activity. By the end of July 2004, RCC contacted 
Hunan to make sure Hunan was on schedule to open by the October 1, 2004, deadline. 
(R. 346 J 34; TT 26:21-23; 27:2-6). 
It was during conversations at the end of July that RCC learned Hunan was building 
a second restaurant in a location on the other side of town. (R. 346 f 35; TT 27:2-6). Hunan 
still did not construct any Tenant Improvements during August. (R. 346 f 36; R. 347 f 38; 
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TT 124:4-6). RCC had several conversations and calls with Hunan to monitor the progress 
of Tenant Improvements and make sure that Hunan could complete Tenant Improvements 
by the deadline. At no time during any of those conversations did Hunan ever raise an issue 
regarding the sufficiency of Landlord's work or the inadequacy of the Premises. (R. 347 
% 37; TT 27:17-22; 29:2-8). Eventually, right after Labor Day in September 2004, Hunan 
began making Tenant Improvements at the Premises. (R. 347 ^ 38; TT 175:4-6). 
When Hunan finally took possession of the Premises on September 6, 2004, it 
triggered paragraph 3 of the Lease which states that "possession of the Premises shall be 
conclusive evidence that Tenant accepts the same and that the Premises are in the condition 
called for by this Lease." (R. 347 ffl 38-39; TT 29:18-30:1). Although Hunan had half-
heartedly started Tenant Improvements in early September, by September 29, 2004 it was 
clear that Hunan was not ready to open its restaurant nor were Tenant Improvements 
completed. Therefore, RCC met with Hunan, at which time Hunan acknowledged that it 
would not be able to open by the October 1 deadline. (R. 347 ^ 41). 
During this September 29 meeting, Hunan raised a few issues regarding Landlord's 
Work and the condition of the Premises: holes in some of the drywall; a leak of some kind 
from the roof; the need for an exhaust fan area located in the roof; and the HVAC system was 
only a seven-ton system when it required a ten-ton system. (R. 347 1J 41; TT 30:6-31:1). 
These were the only items Hunan identified. Hunan did not make any complaint or reference 
to inadequacies of Landlord's Work regarding the restroom, electrical work, T-bar ceiling, 
water heater, plumbing, or flooring, nor did Hunan demand that RCC pay Hunan for any 
work performed by Hunan's contractor. (R. 347 U 42 - R. 348 1j 43; TT 31:2-20). 
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On October 15, 2004, Hunan sent a letter to RCC requesting that the rent 
commencement be delayed from October 1 to December 1. This letter raised issues that 
Hunan thought were significant and, importantly, was silent as to any problems regarding 
restrooms, electrical work, water heater, T-bar ceiling, underground plumbing, or flooring. 
(R. 348 H 45-R. 349 % 47; TT 31:21-25; TT 34:5-20). 
RCC responded to the letter on October 18, in writing, calling Hunan's attention to 
the fact that Hunan was already late in its first payment of rent, as it was due on October 1. 
RCC also reminded Hunan of paragraph 5 of the Lease requiring Hunan to pay the rent 
beginning on the October 1 commencement date even if Hunan had not completed all Tenant 
Improvements. (R. 349 ^ 51). RCC and Hunan continued to negotiate verbally after this 
exchange of letters. On October 29, the parties signed an Agreement Regarding Rent 
Commencement Date and Landlord Work Under Lease Dated October 22nd, 2003 ("Lease 
Modification," copy included behind Tab 1 in the Addendum to this brief) wherein RCC 
agreed to waive one month's rent of $9,540.80 and to perform specific additional work at the 
Premises, and Hunan agreed (i) to accept the Premises as is; and (ii) that all Landlord's Work 
was completed. (R. 349 % 52; R. 373 ] 44; TT 35:4-21; 48:22-49; 50:2). 
With the Lease Modification in place, Hunan was obligated to begin paying rent on 
November 1, 2004. However, Hunan did not pay rent on November 1, but was late in its 
payment. (R. 350 f 57; TT 64:18-65:13). Likewise, Hunan did not make its next rent 
payment due on December 1 as called for under the Lease. (R. 351 % 59; TT 65:15-21). 
When RCC contacted Hunan about getting the December rent paid, Hunan stated that it did 
not have the money, that it did not care about any late fees that would be assessed, and that 
857984vl - 9 -
it was not going to pay until December 14. (R. 351 ^ 60; TT 65:22-66:4). However, on 
December 14 when RCC contacted Hunan about the rent payment, Hunan told RCC's 
representative, Becky Pendleton ("Pendleton"), that she would need to make the forty-minute 
round-trip drive across town and halfway to Santa Clara to pick it up from Hunan at a 
different office. (R. 351 H 61; TT 66:5-14). 
Again, Hunan did not pay the rent installment due on January 3, 2005 and when, on 
January 7, Pendleton called Hunan about the check, Hunan told her that it would just pay 
later. (R. 351 ^ 62; TT 67:18-68:2). Similarly, Hunan did not pay February rent on time 
and, when Pendleton was finally able to contact Hunan on February 9, Hunan told her that 
it would pay the rent when it had the money. (R. 352 ^ 65-67; TT 69:16-70:6). 
In all of these conversations between RCC and Hunan regarding the rent and 
obtaining the payments, Hunan never raised any issue regarding the restrooms, electrical 
work, water heater, T-bar ceiling, flooring, or plumbing at the Premises, nor did Hunan ever 
claim that it was entitled to withhold rent for any reason or contend that Tenant 
Improvements costs should offset Hunan's rent obligation. (R. 352 U 69; TT 68:17-69:15; 
TT 70:20-71:14). 
With Hunan's four initial rent payments all having been made late, RCC became 
increasingly concerned and evaluated its rights under the Lease. One portion of Section 29 
of the Lease provided that if Hunan failed to make timely rent payments for three consecutive 
months, thereafter followed by a fourth late payment, RCC had the right to forfeit Hunan's 
leasehold under the Lease. (R. 352 f 72). Accordingly, on February 18, 2005, RCC 
exercised this remedy by sending a letter to Hunan giving notice of the forfeiture of the 
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leasehold, which included notice of Hunan's responsibility to peaceably and quietly surrender 
the Premises in a broom-clean condition and in good order and repair. (R. 353 j^ 74; TT 
103:8-19). Hunan refused to vacate the Premises. Therefore, on March 4, RCC served 
Hunan with a 5-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy at Will. (R. 353 % 75; R. 353 % 76; 
TT 104:23-105:7). Hunan refused to vacate the Premises within five days as required by the 
5-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy at Will. Therefore, RCC filed the instant unlawful 
detainer action. (R. 354 ^ 76). 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
RCC filed its Eviction Complaint and of Personal Guaranty Enforcement 
("Complaint") on March 29,2005. (R. 1). Appellants were served the 7-day Summons and 
Complaint on April 5, but did not file an Answer until April 18. (R. 16; R. 22). RCC opted 
to invoke its statutory right to post a possession bond and obtained an order from the district 
court on April 18 setting Plaintiffs possession bond amount at $5,000.00. (R. 21). On April 
19, RCC filed its possession bond with the district court in the form of a cash bond and 
served a Notice of Plaintiff s Possession Bond on Hunan on April 20. (R. 29). Hunan did 
not request a hearing on the possession bond, nor did it post a bond in an amount approved 
by the district court within three (3) days as required by the Utah Code. The district court 
determined that Hunan failed to comply with the Utah Code regarding the notice of RCC s 
payment of possession bond and entered an Order of Restitution, which was served on Hunan 
during the first week of May 2005. (R. 41; R. 354 ^  78). Hunan still refused to vacate the 
Premises even after having been served the Order of Restitution and only finally vacated 
when the order was enforced by changing the locks. (R. 354 ^ 78). 
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On May 23, 2005, RCC's counsel proposed a discovery plan and scheduling order 
("Proposed Plan") to Appellants' counsel. (R. 128 U 2). Hunan's counsel would not 
participate in discussions about the Proposed Plan during the next ten days. (R. 128 % 3-4). 
On June 7, RCC's counsel filed a motion requesting that the district court adopt the Proposed 
Plan, which motion was granted. (R. 128-38). By June 15, the district court had entered the 
Rule 26 Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order ("Scheduling Order"). (R. 136). The 
Scheduling Order set a deadline of July 29, 2005, to amend pleadings. (R. 136 ^ 2). 
On August 1, 2005, Appellants filed a Motion to Amend Counterclaim ("Motion to 
Amend") with the district court (R. 156), which RCC opposed. (R. 167). Prior to this, RCC 
had obtained a release of its possession bond (R. 100), and Appellants had brought a Motion 
for Relief From Order Releasing Plaintiffs Possession Bond ("Motion for Relief) (R. 106). 
On June 29, Appellants filed a Request to Submit for Decision on the Motion for Relief. (R. 
148). On July 22, the district court set the Motion for Relief for hearing on August 18,2005 
(R. 154), at which time it denied the Motion for Relief. (R. 174). The district court 
conducted a pretrial conference on December 8, 2005, which neither Appellants nor their 
counsel bothered to attend. (R. 178). 
Despite all of this other activity in the case in July, August, and December, Appellants 
did not promptly seek resolution of their Motion to Amend. Rather, on January 17, 2006, 
approximately five and a half months after the Motion to Amend was filed, Hunan finally 
filed a Request to Submit for Decision. (R. 180). The district court heard oral argument on 
the Motion to Amend and ultimately denied the Motion to Amend, entering its Order on 
April 5,2006. (R.251). On April 19, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal. (R.298). With 
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the appeal, Appellants filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Orders of the 
Trial Court ("Petition for Interlocutory Appeal"), which Petition was ultimately denied by 
this Court. (R.321). 
Because of the pendency of the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, the district court 
continued the original May 3 trial date. Ultimately, the trial took place on November 28 and 
29,2006. (R. 336-37). On April 10,2007, the district court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Findings"). (R. 340-76). The Findings required a judgment to be 
entered against Appellants in favor of RCC for all damages sought by RCC in the total 
amount of $113,298.65 and completely dismissed the Counterclaim and all defenses of 
Hunan. (R. 359-75). 
However, despite a Lease provision entitling RCC to recover its costs and attorneys' 
fees, the district court refused to award costs and attorneys' fees to RCC. In response, RCC 
filed a Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Rule 52 Motion 
to Amend") to allow an award of attorneys' fees. (R. 389). On July 17, 2007, the district 
court entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, a copy of which is included 
behind Tab 2 in the Addendum to this brief. (R. 402). Judgment was ultimately entered on 
September 11,2007 ("Judgment"). (R. 412). On October 10, thirty days after entry of the 
Judgment, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal. (R. 437). Nine days later on October 19, 
2007, RCC filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal. (R. 457). At the time Appellants filed their 
Notice of Appeal, they had already realized that they may have an appellate timeliness 
problem, and on the same day they filed their Notice of Appeal, they also filed an Ex-Parte 
Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal (R. 432), which the district court denied. (R. 466). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case arose as an unlawful detainer action wherein RCC sought to evict Hunan 
from the Premises. Appellants contested RCC's right to evict Hunan from the Premises 
throughout the proceedings, including at trial. Therefore, Appellants' right to appeal is 
governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure as applied to unlawful detainer proceedings. 
This includes a requirement that any appeal be filed within ten days after an appealable 
judgment is entered. The appealable Judgment in this case was entered September 11,2007, 
and Hunan did not file its appeal until October 10, 2007, which is the 30th day after the 
Judgment was entered. Hunan's failure to file its notice of appeal within the ten days divests 
this Court of jurisdiction, and this appeal should be dismissed on that ground. 
Turning to the merits of the case, RCC had the right to forfeit Hunan's leasehold 
based on Hunan's consistent failure to pay rent on time. The Lease provides that there are 
both material and non-material defaults possible under the Lease. There are different 
remedies associated with the different types of default. Although it is possible that a non-
material default by late payment of rent may ripen to a material default of the Lease, it is not 
mandatory. The Lease also provides that, if Hunan commits the same default for three 
consecutive months, RCC is entitled to forfeit Hunan's leasehold on the next default by 
Hunan. It does not matter if any of the non-material defaults had become a material default 
and were later cured. This is what happened in the instant case, and RCC exercised that right 
to forfeit Hunan's leasehold under the Lease. With the Leasehold forfeited, Hunan's 
continued occupancy of the Premises became a tenancy at will, which RCC properly 
terminated pursuant to Utah Code. 
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Although Appellants tried to defend Hunan's position with a Counterclaim alleging 
that RCC had first breached the Lease and therefore should not be entitled to terminate the 
Lease, the district court properly rej ected Appellants' arguments to that effect and determined 
that Appellants had waived all such claims. This waiver was an express waiver, as evidenced 
by the Lease Modification. In addition to that express waiver, the district court found 
numerous facts to support an implied waiver as well. The district court properly concluded 
that the express waiver, as well as the implied waiver, established that Appellants did not 
have a claim for offset, and therefore dismissed Appellants' Counterclaim in full. 
Appellants had tried to amend their Counterclaim prior to trial. However, Appellants 
did not submit a memorandum giving any appropriate factual or legal reason for the district 
court to grant their motion. The district court denied the Motion to Amend based on this 
failure to provide any rational reason in law or fact, along with several other reasons 
enumerated by the district court in its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. 
Appellants have latched onto one of those enumerated reasons as though that is the whole 
reason the district court denied the Motion to Amend, and focus their argument on that one 
reason while ignoring the other reasons. The one reason was whether a request to submit for 
decision needs to be filed at any particular time after a motion has been filed. However, 
since the district court entered its decision based on multiple grounds and conclusions, its 
decision can easily be upheld on those other grounds. 
Finally, the district court, in making its award to RCC, refused to award RCC its 
attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the Lease. This ruling of the district court goes contrary 
to the Lease provision which allows recovery of attorneys' fees, as well as the statutory 
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provision which requires that the court shall award attorneys' fees when they are provided 
for by the underlying contract. The district court relied on Utah case law that allows a court, 
in extraordinary circumstances, to refuse to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. 
However, the extraordinary circumstances that might give rise to such an anomaly are not 
present in this case, and the district court should be reversed in this conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS APPEAL IS UNTIMELY BECAUSE IT IS AN APPEAL IN AN 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION, AND APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE 
THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN TEN DAYS 
First, this appeal is untimely, because it is an appeal in an unlawful detainer action, 
and the Rules of Appellate Procedure require that such appeals be filed within ten days after 
entry of judgment. Despite Appellants' creative arguments to the contrary, this appeal is in 
fact an appeal in an unlawful detainer action. It is undisputed that Appellants did not file this 
appeal within ten days after entry of judgment. Accordingly, this Court should conclude that 
it lacks jurisdiction, and should dismiss this appeal, because it was filed too late. 
A. A Notice of Appeal from an Unlawful Detainer Complaint Must Be Filed 
Within Ten Days of the Entry of the Final Judgment or Order 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a) states that "when a judgment or order is entered in a[n] . . . 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within [ten] days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from." This Court has recently held that this rule means what it says: 
This matter originated as a complaint for unlawful detainer. Because this was 
initiated as an unlawful detainer action, the Gerbers were required to file their 
notice of appeal within ten days after the entry of judgment. They failed to do 
so, making their appeal untimely and depriving this court of jurisdiction. 
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See Noorlander v. Gerber, 2007 UT App 346, %3; Preferred Property MgmL v. Paulman, 
2008 UT App 252; see also Vickery v. Kaiser, 556 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976) (stating that "this 
action is clearly one brought under the forcible entry statute" and was therefore subject to a 
ten-day appeal deadline). 
Appellants argued to the district court that shortening the time for appeal to ten days 
was not fair or consistent with the other rules of court. (R. 434-35). This claim, even if true, 
does not help Appellants because a rule is a rule, and it must be enforced. As noted above, 
this Court has continually enforced the ten-day appeal deadline in unlawful detainer cases, 
and there does not seem to be any controversy about it. In any event, however, the ten-day 
appeal deadline in unlawful detainer cases does in fact have sound policy justification, as it 
is necessary to promote the policy of "speedy determination" of unlawful detainer actions. 
See Vickery, 556 P.2d at 502-03. "Although such deadlines are concededly arbitrary, they 
must be adhered to in order to prevent cases from continually lingering and to ensure finality 
in the system." Serratov. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,1(11,13P.3d616. The ten-
day requirement for a notice of appeal in an unlawful detainer claim is clear and robust, and 
there is no reason why this Court should abandon its clear precedent. 
B. This Case Was Filed as an Unlawful Detainer Action and Always 
Remained an Unlawful Detainer Action, and Therefore This Appeal Is 
Untimely 
Before the district court, in an ex parte filing made the same day they filed their notice 
of appeal, Appellants next argued that the ten-day appeal deadline did not apply because, 
they asserted, this case was not an unlawful detainer case. (R. 432). Nothing could be 
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further from reality. One of the elements to an unlawful detainer action is the determination 
of the right to possession of the leased property. This case originated as an unlawful detainer 
action and always remained an unlawful detainer action. All of the issues in the case were 
closely related to—indeed, stemmed from—the unlawful detainer claim. The Complaint was 
filed to evict Hunan, have the premises restored to RCC, and obtain a judgment for the 
damages as allowed pursuant to the unlawful detainer statute. Appellants, in a pretrial 
motion brought after possession had been restored to RCC, argued to the district court that 
Hunan's "right to possession has not yet been litigated." (R. 105). This is a stereotypical 
unlawful detainer action. 
Appellants are not the first litigants in an unlawful detainer case to belatedly realize 
that they have missed the appeal deadline. In such cases, the typical reaction appears to be 
to try to hastily characterize the case as something other than an unlawful detainer action, in 
hopes that the thirty-day (rather than the ten-day) appeal deadline will apply. Over the years, 
some litigants have succeeded with this strategy, while others have failed. The ones who 
succeed are able to show that the lawsuit included separate claims for equitable or 
declaratory relief, such that the lawsuit could not fairly be characterized as an unlawful 
detainer action. Appellants cannot make this showing here. 
In their brief, Appellants assert that "the thirty day time limit applies even where a 
complaint alleges unlawful detainer if the case involves additional claims," see Aplt. Br., at 
21, but the only "additional claims" they can point to are their counterclaim "against RCC 
for breach of the Lease" and RCC's separate claim "for breach of the Lease against Knox 
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as a personal guarantor," id. at 22 (emphasis added). Appellants do not, and cannot, point 
to any other additional claims. 
Utah appellate courts have long made clear that, where the only additional claim in 
an unlawful detainer action was for breach of the lease, that is insufficient to lift the case out 
of the ten-day appellate deadline, because all unlawful detainer actions, at some level, 
involve issues relating to whether the lease was breached. See Brandley v. Lewis, 92 P.2d 
338 (Utah 1939). In order to remove the case from the "unlawful detainer" category and thus 
from the ten-day deadline, truly separate additional claims must be present, such as, for 
instance, equitable claims or claims for declaratory relief. See Gordon Case & Co, v. West, 
2005 UT App 304, ffi|7-l 1, 117 P.3d 1070; Fashions Four Corp. v. Fashion Place Assoc, 
681 P.2d 830, 831 (Utah 1984); Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply, 188 P. 1117 (Utah 
1920). Appellants do not—and cannot—argue that there were any such claims present here. 
Because Appellants can only point to claims relating to breach of the Lease as the 
"additional claims," they run headlong into Brandley, the case most factually similar to this 
one. In Brandley, the plaintiff brought a "straight typical unlawful detainer complaint." 
Brandley, 92 P.2d at 339. The defendant mounted a defense based on certain provisions of 
the lease, which she claimed demonstrated that her detainer of the premises was not 
unlawful. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, but not 
within ten days. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, and the defendant (like Hunan here) 
claimed that the case was not an unlawful detainer case, but rather was a case "for the 
construction of a lease." Id. 
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The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the case was in fact an 
unlawful detainer action that needed to be appealed, if at all, within ten days. The Court 
rejected the defendant's efforts to portray the case as one regarding lease construction: 
Since unlawful detainer is an action to oust a tenant whose lease has expired 
or been terminated, it follows that plaintiff must show that defendant's lease 
has terminated. In this cause, that termination depended upon the terms of the 
contract of lease To determine therefore whether defendant was in 
unlawful detainer the court must determine the meaning and effect of the 
[lease], but that does not change the action from one in unlawful detainer. 
It is merely deciding a question the decision of which is necessary in making 
a determination as to whether defendant is in unlawful detainer. 
Id. at 339-40 (emphasis added). 
The Brandley Court, in reaching its decision, distinguished Ottenheimer, noting that 
the situation might have been different had "defendant in her pleadings raised some issue in 
equity," but that absent such issues, the case was an unlawful detainer action that must be 
appealed, if at all, within ten days. Id. at 340. By contrast, in Ottenheimer, the plaintiff 
sought not only to evict the defendant, but to quiet title in a parcel abutting the leased 
premises as well. The Ottenheimer court noted that the plaintiff, who sought to enforce the 
ten-day appeal requirement, had also sought to enforce the equitable aspect quiet title of its 
claim throughout the proceedings. 188 P. at 1118. Under these circumstances, the court 
concluded that the thirty-day, rather than the ten-day, appeal period should apply, because 
not all of the issues in the case stemmed from the unlawful detainer action. Id.; see also 
Fashions Four, 681 P.2d at 831 (stating "that the hybrid nature of plaintiffs action, 
containing additional declaratory and equitable causes, and of the defendant's counterclaim 
with similar causes, prevents [the ten-day period] from controlling the time for appeal"). 
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Even more recently, this Court has affirmed the principles announced in Brandley and 
Ottenheimer. In Gordon Case, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer suit, and the defendant 
successfully moved to dismiss the case. The plaintiff appealed, but waited until the thirtieth 
day following entry of judgment to do so. This Court, on appeal, after analyzing the relevant 
rules and statutes, concluded "that all matters stemming from an unlawful detainer action, 
including alleged procedural irregularities committed during the action, are subject to the ten-
day period." See Gordon Case, 2005 UT App 304, [^11 (emphasis added). 
In this case, there is a reason why Appellants are unable to point to additional and 
separate equitable or declaratory claims, as were present in Ottenheimer: there aren't any. 
According to Utah law, a successful unlawful detainer action not only results in the 
restitution of the premises, but includes damages for the unlawful detainer, waste to the 
premises, the amount of rent due, and attorney's fees if provided for in the lease. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-811. It also allows for certain damages to be trebled. All of the issues 
in this case were expressly mentioned in this statute, or directly "stemmed" from it. 
RCC's complaint contained only two causes of action, one for unlawful detainer 
action and one for enforcement of the personal guaranty. Appellants' Counterclaim was 
nothing more than an attempt to offset damages by amounts they claimed Hunan was owed 
under the Lease, as well as an attempt to argue that Hunan was not in unlawful detainer under 
the terms of the Lease. The damages sought by RCC were simply those related to the amount 
of rent due and for the period of unlawful detainer as allowed under the statute. The 
Counterclaim was an argument to have that amount reduced. The personal guaranty, which 
was an integral requirement for RCC to enter the Lease, simply assigns responsibility for 
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who will be responsible for payment of the damages. Finally, although the Premises had 
been restored to RCC through the possession bond procedure, Appellants continued to argue 
at trial that RCC was not entitled to possession. In sum, this case is indistinguishable from 
Brandley—this case was filed as an unlawful detainer case, and Appellants defended the 
matter by trying to show that RCC itself had breached the Lease and was, thereofore, not 
entitled to recover the Premises. 
RCC's point is further driven home by examination of Appellants' docketing 
statement, where they set forth 18 issues for appeal. Six of those issues—items (e), (f), (g), 
(h), (k), and (o)—involve their argument against unlawful detainer and RCC's right to 
possession. Nine of the issues—items (a), (b), (c), (d), (i), (j), (1), (n), and (r)—involve its 
claim to offset the unlawful detainer damages awarded to RCC. Appellants raised one issue 
(m) regarding the personal guaranty, and two issues, (p) and (q), regarding pre- and post-
judgment interest. 
The trial was not just about the amount of money damages to be awarded to RCC. 
The trial was about RCC's right to have possession restored to it under the unlawful detainer 
statute. The issues tried all arose from the unlawful detainer action. Therefore, the ten-day 
requirement for filing the notice of appeal controls. Appellants filed its notice of appeal well 
past the ten days required and the district court denied its motion for an extension of time to 
file. Therefore, the appeal is untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter and 
should dismiss the appeal. Likewise, RCC's cross-appeal is only timely if Appellants' appeal 
is timely. Therefore, the cross-appeal should also be dismissed. 
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II. RCC PROPERLY TERMINATED THE LEASE WHEN HUNAN FAILED TO 
PAY ITS RENT TIMELY FOR FOUR CONSECUTIVE MONTHS 
In their initial brief, Appellants admit that for four consecutive months—November 
2004 through February 2005—Hunan paid its rent late. Under the plain language of the 
Lease, RCC could terminate Hunan's tenancy after the fourth late rent payment. 
Accordingly, RCC was within its rights to terminate Hunan's leasehold. 
A* The Lease Permitted RCC to Terminate Hunan's Tenancy Upon One 
Material Default and Failure to Cure, or Upon Three Non-Material 
Defaults Followed By One Additonal Non-Material Default 
The Lease provides two separate methods by which Hunan's late payment of rent 
could result in the termination of its tenancy. 
First, Hunan could fail to make a rental payment when due and further fail to pay the 
rent within the ten days following a notice of default from RCC. The Lease calls this failure 
a "material default and breach": 
Tenant shall be in material default and breach under this Lease if (i) Tenant 
shall default in the payment as and when due of any Minimum Rent, 
Additional Rent or any other amount required to be paid by Tenant hereunder, 
and such default shall continue for a period often (10) days after written notice 
thereof from Landlord. 
See Lease (attached to Aplt. Br. as Tab 1), % 29. As soon as Hunan committed a material 
default and breach, RCC had the right to terminate Hunan's leasehold: 
[TJhen Landlord shall have, in addition to any other remedies at law, or in 
equity, without the requirement of any further notice to Tenant, the notice 
provided by this Section 29, being intended to be in addition to any such 
requirements, and without barring later election of any other other remedy, any 
one or more of the following remedies at Landlord's election . . . 
* * * 
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A. By written notice to Tenant, Landlord may terminate this Lease and 
Tenant's right to possession, reenter the Premises in the manner allowed by 
law and repossess the Premises, in which event this Lease shall terminate. 
Id. RCC hereafter refers to this portion of Section 29 as the "Single Material Default 
Provision." 
Second, the Lease permits RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy once Hunan defaults 
in its obligation to pay rent for three consecutive months, then followed by late payment in 
one additional month: 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, if Tenant shall default in the 
payment of any Rent, or any sum of money due to be paid by Tenant 
hereunder, or in the timely reporting of Gross Sales as required by Section 5 
of the Lease,... then notwithstanding that such default shall have been cured 
within the period after notice as provided by this Section 29, any further or 
additional default, whether of a similar or dissimilar nature, shall be deemed 
to be deliberate and Landlord need not afford Tenant an opportunity to cure 
any further or additional default as provided by this Section 29, but shall have 
the right, at Landlord's option in addition to, and not in limitation of, any other 
right or remedy available to Landlord at law, in equity, or hereunder, to 
terminate this Lease giving Tenant a three (3) day written notice of 
cancellation. 
Id, RCC hereafter refers to this provision as the "Cumulative Default Provision." 
B. Utah Law Enforces Lease Default Provisions as Written 
Leases are contracts and interpreted by the "well-settled rules of contract 
interpretation." McEwan v. Mountain Land Support Corp,, 2005 UT App 240, f 16,116 P.3d 
955. Contract interpretation "begins with an examination of the contract itself." Trolley 
Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
When "[t]he language of the relevant contracts between [the parties] establishing the 
lease appears to be complete and unambiguous, [courts] apply the 'four comers5 rule of 
857984vl -24-
contract analysis, looking no further than the language of the lease." Oakwood Vill LLC v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,1(17, 104 P.3d 1226; see also Baxter v. Saunders Outdoor 
Adver,, Inc., 2007 UT App 340, ^ [11,171 P.3d 469 ("If the language within the four corners 
of the contract is unambiguous . . . [we] determine [ ] the parties' intentions from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law.") (alterations in original); Trolley 
Square, 886 P.2d, at 63 ("The initial question of whether the lease agreement is ambiguous 
is a question of law.") (citations omitted). Accordingly, surrounding circumstances or parol 
evidence may not be used "to create ambiguity where the language of the contract would not 
otherwise permit." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^27, — P.3d —. 
Daines is the Utah Supreme Court's most recent decision dealing with principles of 
contract interpretation. There, that court noted that "a finding of ambiguity will prove to be 
the exception and not the rule." Daines, 2008 UT 51, at f30 n. 5. A lease need not be "a 
model of clarity" to be deemed unambiguous. See, e.g., McEwan, 2005 UT App, at ^ J25 
("While these factors suggest that the Lease is not a model of clarity, they do not make it 
ambiguous."); Trolley Square, 886 P.2d, at 65 ("While the lease agreement is not a model 
of clarity, we find the lease term is defined sufficiently within the four corners of the 
document "). Lease provisions are ambiguous only if there is more than one reasonable 
interpretation of the provision. See Baxter, 2007 UT App, at f 11 ("A lease agreement, like 
any contract, is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because 
of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies."). 
In determining whether ambiguities exist, courts "consider each contract provision 
. . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." 
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Kenney v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209,1J42,186 P.3d 989 (omission in original). Also, "a party 
cannot make a successful claim of ambiguity based on usage of a term that is not reasonable 
or is the product of 'forced or strained construction.'" Daines, 2008 UT, at |^30 n.5. 
The Lease in this case is not ambiguous, and the district court correctly so concluded. 
See District Court Legal Conclusion 4 (stating that the "Lease between the parties, as 
modified by the Lease Modification, is . . . unambiguous, and is binding upon the parties"). 
These provisions are therefore enforceable and binding on Appellants. 
C. After Hunan's Four Late Payments, RCC Properly Terminated Hunan's 
Tenancy Pursuant to the Cumulative Default Provision 
The Lease creates two distinct categories of default: (1) "material breach and 
default" and (2) a default that is non-material. The former—contained in the Single 
Material Default Provision—permits RCC to terminate Hunan's leasehold as soon as Hunan 
(i) fails to make a single payment of Rent when due, and (ii) further fails to make that 
payment within 10 days ("Cure Period") following RCC's written notice to Hunan of 
Hunan's failure ("Default Notice"). 
However, RCC terminated Hunan's tenancy pursuant to the Cumulative Default 
Provision. The Single Material Default Provision, the concept of "material default," the 
Cure Period and the Default Notice have nothing to do with RCC's termination of Hunan's 
tenancy or with the issues on appeal. Indeed, except to say there is no Cure Period, the 
Cumulative Default Provision does not even use the word "cure." 
The Cumulative Default Provision gives RCC the right to terminate Hunan's 
leasehold as soon as Hunan (1) has simply defaulted "for three (3) consecutive months" in 
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the payment of rent, and (2) thereafter makes just one more "further or additional default" 
in its timely payment of rent. After Hunan has committed three consecutive defaults by 
paying rent late, RCC "need not afford [Hunan] an opportunity to cure [the fourth] further 
or additional default..." None of this requires a material default. 
In their initial brief, Appellants accept the plain language of the Cumulative Default 
Provision providing that RCC did not have to give Hunan either a Default Notice or a Cure 
Period upon Hunan's fourth failure to pay rent after Hunan's three consecutive failures. 
However, Appellants argue that the Cumulative Default Provision required RCC to give 
Hunan both a Default Notice and a Cure Period for each of the three consecutive defaults 
that Hunan committed in November and December 2004 and in January 2005. See Aplt. Br., 
at 13, 18,32-33. 
Appellants' argument requires this Court to conflate the language and purpose of the 
Single Material Default Provision with the language and purpose of the Cumulative Default 
Provision. For the following reasons, the Court should decline Appellants' invitation to 
create a hybrid default provision that is not contained in the Lease. 
First, a Default Notice has no independent significance under the Lease. Nothing in 
either provision requires RCC to send out any Default Notices. The Single Material Default 
Provision simply requires that, before RCC can terminate Hunan's tenancy for missing a 
single payment (which the Single Material Default Provision refers to as a "material default 
and breach"), RCC must provide Hunan with a Default Notice and afford Hunan the Cure 
Period before Hunan's single missed payment can ripen from a non-material default into a 
"material default and breach," which permits RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy. The fact 
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that RCC might have sent out one or more Default Notices in connection with its rights 
under the Single Material Default Provision does not translate to a requirement that RCC 
must have sent Hunan three Default Notices as a condition precedent to RCC's ability to 
terminate Hunan's tenancy under the Cumulative Default Provision. 
Second, for the same reasons, the Single Material Default Provision concept of a 
single "material default and breach" sufficient to terminate Hunan's tenancy has nothing to 
do with the concept of repetitive missed payments that give rise to RCC's rights under the 
Cumulative Default Provision. 
Third, the policies of the two provisions are different. Under the Single Material 
Default Provision a single failure to cure a missed rental payment is sufficient grounds for 
RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy. By contrast, the Cumulative Default Provision focuses 
on a pattern of late payments that are collectively (not individually) sufficient to justify 
RCC's termination of Hunan's leasehold. The Cumulative Default Provision emphasizes 
that a series of non-material defaults in paying Rent, even if each is cured, is "deemed to be 
deliberate." Appellants' argument relies on certain language in the Cumulative Default 
Provision ("notwithstanding that [the three consecutive] default shall have been cured within 
the period after notice as provided by this Section 29 . . . " ) . The phrase "notwithstanding 
that" is merely a fancy way of saying "although." See Webster's New International 
Dictionary oj the English Language (2d ed., unabridged, 1960), at 1670. This provision 
merely makes clear (and Appellants do not dispute) that once Hunan has failed to pay rent 
on time for three consecutive months, RCC is not required to give Hunan either a Default 
Notice or Cure Period upon Hunan's fourth late payment of Rent, even though RCC may 
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have given Hunan one or more Default Notices and Cure Periods in connection with the 
three consecutive late Rent payments. Nothing in the language requires RCC to have sent 
Hunan three Default Notices and afforded Hunan three Cure Periods before RCC could take 
advantage of the Cumulative Default Provision. 
Fourth, by definition, the Cumulative Default Provision does not need to be based on 
a pattern of late cures (beyond the ten days allowed by the Cure Period), because under the 
Single Material Default Provision, a single non-material default that Hunan fails to cure 
within the Cure Period automatically ripens into a "material breach and default." There need 
never be a second material breach and default, because one was sufficient for RCC to 
terminate Hunan's tenancy. 
Fifth, Appellants admit that, although Hunan made untimely Rent payments for 
November and December 2004 and January 2005, Hunan did pay the rent and late fees due 
for those months. See Aplt. Br., at 11, 32. Because Hunan had paid the rent and late fees, 
there simply was no reason for RCC to send Hunan either a Default Notice or afford Hunan 
a Cure Period. They would have been meaningless gestures, and the law does not require 
a futile or vain act, and excuses performance of any act that would have been "an idle 
ceremony and of no avail." See Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT App 243,1J15, 139 P.3d 271. 
For all these reasons, there was no reason for RCC to have sent Hunan Default 
Notices or to have afforded Hunan Cure Periods for November and December 2004 and 
January 2005. This failure is the only grounds on which Appellants challenge RCC's right 
to terminate Hunan's tenancy, and the Court should affirm the district court's Conclusions 
of Law numbers 4,7 [sic] (on page 22, beginning "Paragraph 6 of the Lease . . .") and 6-8. 
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III. DUE TO HUNAN'S DELIBERATE PATTERN OF RENT PAYMENT 
DEFAULTS AND RCC'S TERMINATION OF THE LEASE, HUNAN WAS IN 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER, AND THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY 
APPLIED THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE AND PROPERLY 
ASSESSED DAMAGES 
The Cumulative Default Provision permits RCC to 
terminate this Lease giving Tenant a three (3) day written notice of cancellation. 
Upon the expiration of said three (3) days, this Lease shall terminate without in 
any way releasing Tenant from Tenant's liability hereunder with regard to a 
termination of this Lease in the event of a default by Tenant under this Lease. 
See Lease (attached to Aplt. Br. as Tab 1), Tj 29. Accordingly, once Hunan failed to pay its 
February 2005 rent on the February 1 due date, it was subject to the Cumulative Default 
Provision. RCC, in compliance with the Cumulative Default Provision, issued its Notice of 
Cancellation of Lease ("Cancellation Notice") on February 18, 2005. (R. 7-11). 
A. Hunan Was in Unlawful Detainer 
Hunan did not vacate the Premises within three days required by the Cumulative 
Default Provision of the Lease and the Cancellation Notice. On the fourth day, Hunan 
accordingly became a tenant at will. See District Court's Conclusion No. 11 (R. 362-63). 
Appellants do not challenge that conclusion. They just ignore it, as well as the portion 
of Utah's unlawful detainer statute specifically dealing with tenants at will. The statutory 
provision applicable to tenants at will, provides as follows: 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an 
unlawful detainer: 
* * * 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:... 
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(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in 
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice 
of not less than five days;.. . 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802(l)(b)(ii) (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
3(l)(b)(ii)) ("subsection (b)(ii)"). Appellants ignore this statute, and instead make two 
arguments why Hunan was not in unlawful detainer. 
First, Appellants again argue that RCC had to give Hunan Default Notices and Cure 
Periods for each of the three consecutive defaults that Hunan committed in November and 
December 2004 and in January 2005. See Aplt. Br., at 2,36. RCC has already explained in 
Part II.C, supra, why this is not the case. 
Second, Appellants argue that (i) Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802(l)(c) (the former 
section 78-36-3(1 )(c) ("subsection (l)(c)")) is the unlawful detainer statute applicable to 
Hunan, (ii) this statute required RCC to give Hunan the alternative of either paying rent or 
surrendering the Premises, and (iii) because the Cancellation Notice failed to give Hunan that 
choice, Hunan was not in unlawful detainer. 
In making this argument, Appellants ignore the fact that the default that terminated 
Hunan's tenancy was not Hunan's non-payment of the February 2005 rent installment. RCC 
terminated Hunan's tenancy because of a pattern of four late Rent payments that the 
Cumulative Default Provision "deemed to be deliberate." 
Because (i) RCC permissibly issued the Cancellation Notice based on Hunan's pattern 
of deliberate delay in paying Rent, and not on a missed Rent payment, and (ii) the Lease 
expressly authorized RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy based on Hunan's pattern of late 
payment, subsection (l)(c) is not relevant to this dispute. Instead, subsection (b)(ii), dealing 
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with tenants at will, is the relevant statute. Because RCC complied with the requirements 
of subsection (b)(ii), this Court should affirm the district court's Conclusions of Law 
numbers 10 through 13. 
B. The District Court Properly Assessed Unlawful Detainer Damages 
In their challenge to unlawful detainer damages, Appellants merely repeat arguments 
they make elsewhere in their initial brief. Accordingly, RCC incorporates its arguments 
made elsewhere in this brief responding to Appellants' arguments. For those reasons, this 
Court should affirm the district court's Conclusions of Law numbers 14-15. 
C. The Issue Regarding an Early Refund of Possession Bond Is Moot 
Next, Appellants ask this Court to reverse the district court's order refunding RCC's 
possession bond. Appellants assert that the key purpose of the possession bond filed by RCC 
is to have the bond money available to reimburse Hunan if the court were to rule in 
Appellants' favor. Appellants do not provide any case law to support their position that the 
district court committed reversible error in refunding the possession bond paid by RCC. 
Regardless of Appellants' failure to brief this issue, because the purpose as stated by 
Appellants is only effective if Appellants were to have obtained a ruling in their favor, the 
issue is moot as the trial court did not rule in Appellants' favor. Therefore, Appellants have 
not been harmed by the trial court's ruling. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT APPELLANTS 
WAIVED THEIR CLAIM THAT RCC BREACHED THE LEASE 
Next, the district court properly concluded that Appellants waived their claim that RCC 
breached the Lease. Hunan failed to act in a timely manner throughout construction of the 
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Premises and waived several issues that it later tried to raise as a breach of contract by RCC. 
The district court has broad discretion in determining whether the testimony and evidence 
at trial support its Findings that Appellants waived their claims. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82 T|23, 100 P.3d 1177. In order to challenge the district court's Findings, Appellants 
must marshal all of the evidence in support of the Findings. Id. at If 76. Appellants have not 
even attempted to marshal the evidence, and have not argued that they have met the 
marshaling requirement. Therefore, this Court must accept all of the Findings as valid. Id. 
a t l 19-20, 80. 
Appellants' statement of facts in their brief does not refer to the Findings; rather, it 
relies on various portions of Knox's own trial testimony to the exclusion of the Findings. In 
doing this, Appellants' simply re-argue their case presented to the district court, which is not 
permitted. Id. at 1J 77. Therefore, Appellants' references to the trial transcript to the 
exclusion of the Findings are irrelevant and should be rejected. 
The district court set out very detailed conclusions of law detailing how it concluded, 
based on the evidence, that Appellants waived their rights with knowledge of what they were 
waiving. (R. 368 ^ | 30-R. 373 f 45). In order for Appellants to prevail on appeal, this Court 
must review the actual conclusions of law and determine that in each situation enumerated 
by the district court, that it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that, on these facts, there 
was a waiver. See Chen, 2004 UT 82, f42. Unless Appellants actually challenge the district 
court's findings, this Court can only refer to the district court's Findings in performing this 
evaluation, and not the tidbits of testimony referenced by Appellants in their brief. 
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In order to determine that Appellants waived their claims and rights, the district court 
had to apply a three-prong test: (1) whether Appellants had an existing right, benefit or 
advantage; (2) whether Appellants had knowledge of its existence; and (3) whether 
Appellants intended to relinquish the right. See Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 
7,9 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). If a waiver is found, the waiving party is precluded from asserting 
an action or defense based upon the waived right or benefit. See, e.g., Bakowski v. Mountain 
States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, ffi[21-32,40,52 P.3d 1179 (holding that party waived its right 
to subrogation and upholding dismissal of party's subrogation claim); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. 
Kingston, 2005 UT App 233,1[9,114 P.3d 1158 ("Once a party intentionally relinquishes the 
right to rescind, it is thereafter prohibited from asserting that right."). 
The first element of waiver—an existing right, benefit or advantage—may be found 
in a contract. A contract may grant a promisor existing contractual rights, benefits, or 
advantages, such as the right to cancel a contract if certain conditions are not met. See, e.g., 
Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) (upholding 
contract in which party retained right to terminate contract if value of property would not 
justify further contract performance). The second element—knowledge of a right's 
existence—may be inferred from a party's signature on a contract: "[a] party may not sign 
a contract and thereafter assert ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense." John 
CallEngg, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205,1208 (Utah 1987). Appellants do not 
challenge the district court's conclusion that the first two prongs of the test are met. 
Relinquishment of a contractual right, the final element of waiver, must be distinctly 
made and may be express or implied. Soter 's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 
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P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). To find relinquishment, "a fact finder need only determine 
whether the totality of the circumstances 'warrants the inference of relinquishment/" IHC 
Health Servs., Inc. v. D &KMgmL, Inc., 2003 UT 5, f7, 73 P.3d 320 (quoting Soter's9 857 
P.2d at 942). In the case at hand, there was an express waiver. Hunan signed the Lease 
Modification, which distinctly stated that all Landlord's Work was completed and that Hunan 
was accepting the Premises as is. See Lease Modification (behind Tab 1, attached hereto). 
This is a distinct express waiver of the claim that Landlord's Work was not yet complete. 
The Lease defines Landlord's Work as both performing certain construction and paying for 
it. The statement in the Lease Modification that the Landlord's Work is complete is a 
statement that it is both constructed and paid for. Based on that statement, RCC would have 
no obligation to construct or pay for any item enumerated as Landlord's Work in the Lease 
other than specific items in the Lease Modification. 
In addition to this express waiver, the district court, in paragraph 39 of its conclusions 
of law, set out the framework for its conclusions that Appellants waived their various 
contract rights based on both express and implied waiver, stating as follows: 
39. In the case at hand, Tenant had its specific rights and time frames 
outlined within the Lease regarding the acceptance or rejection of Landlord's 
Work, as well as obligations to provide plans and specifications to Landlord to 
guide that work: 
A. The Lease states in Exhibit "C," subparagraph 1 (bate-
stamped page RCC-00051), "Tenant shall deliver two sets of plans to 
Landlord within thirty (30) days of date of Lease execution and Landlord 
shall have ten (10) days to review and approve said plans and 
specifications." Paragraph 5 of the Lease (bate-stamped page RCC-
000011) states "Prior to the commencement of Tenant's Work or any 
alterations or additions in, or to the Premises, Tenant shall deliver to 
Landlord, for its written approval, all drawings, plans and specifications 
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for Tenant's Work or any addition or alteration (collectively referred to 
as "Plans"), which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or unduly 
delayed." Hunan did not submit its plans to RCC for approval. It is thus 
barred from any claim of damages that would arise from the contention 
that something was not located in the proper place at the Premises. 
B. Under paragraph 5 of the Lease, "Tenant shall have the 
right during the thirty (30) day period immediately following Notice of 
Tender to present to Landlord a reasonable punch list of items relating to 
structural items or items described in Exhibit UC" for Landlord to repair 
at Landlord's reasonable discretion." Hunan did not provide a punchlist, 
therefore it waived its right to later claim a problem with [the] state of the 
Landlord's Work now. 
C. Paragraph 3 of the Lease states "Tenant's taking physical 
possession of the Premises shall be conclusive evidence that Tenant 
accepts the same and that the Premises are in the condition called for by 
this Lease." Hunan had the option to not take possession until it was 
satisfied with the condition of the Premises. Likewise, RCC had the right 
to rely on this provision that RCC's work was complete once Hunan took 
possession and began doing its own work at the Premises. RCC had a 
contractual relationship with Watts Construction and could require them 
to come in and complete any work that was overlooked but should have 
been done under the terms of the contract. By taking possession, Hunan 
waived any and all claims that Landlord's Work was incomplete. 
D. In addition, the parties entered the Lease Modification on 
October 29,2004, bate-stamped RCC-000076. Even if Hunan's actions 
up to this point had not been enough to establish that Hunan was waiving 
certain rights under the Lease, Hunan affirmatively accepted the Premises 
as-is and indicated that all of Landlord's work was complete, as set forth 
in the Lease Modification, and Hunan received consideration in the form 
of RCC's waiver of one months rent. Hunan's claim that RCC still 
needed to pay for work Mr. Funk had completed because the Lease 
Modification states that Hunan waives claims for "further" Landlord's 
Work is not persuasive. First, it is inconsistent with the statement that 
Hunan accepts the Premises as-is. Second, the Lease describes as 
Landlord's Work both the payment and the performance of the items set 
forth in Exhibit "C" to the Lease. No further Landlord's Work, therefore, 
means no further payment or performance for the items in Exhibit "C". 
Therefore, Hunan waived any claim for further payment from RCC other 
than what was set forth in the Lease Modification. 
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R. 370-372. 
The district court then specifically stated what rights and claims Hunan waived, stating: 
40. By Hunan's failure to submit plans and specifications to RCC as 
required under the Lease, Hunan waived any claim that RCC failed to provide 
the work set forth in Exhibit "C" to the Lease that could have been prevented 
had Hunan complied with the Lease. Furthermore, RCC gave Hunan the Notice 
of Tender and Hunan then had then thirty days to inspect the Premises and raise 
any issue regarding Landlord's Work. Hunan inspected the Premises but did not 
raise any objections or give notice of any concerns about the condition of the 
Premises or Landlord's Work. 
41. By itss [sic] failure to raise any objections or provide a punchlist, 
Hunan waived its claim that RCC did not fully comply with its obligations under 
the Lease. Any changes that Hunan made after it had accepted the Landlord's 
Work and taken possession of the Premises were undertaken at Hunan's 
expense. 
42. Hunan's waiver of any claim of RCC not performing all of the 
Landlord's Work as required under the Lease was reinforced when Hunan took 
possession of the Premises in September. Under the terms of the Lease, Hunan's 
taking possession and then beginning to do its own work is to be considered 
conclusive evidence that Hunan accepted the Premises as being in the condition 
called for in the Lease. 
43. Finally, on October 29, 2004, Hunan specified in writing that 
Landlord's Work was complete except for four things that RCC agreed to do, as 
specified in the Lease Modification. Hunan specifically accepted the Premises 
as-is. 
44. In consideration of what was to be a full and final resolution of 
any claim on this issue, RCC agreed to waive the outstanding October rent of 
$9,540.80 and alter the Rent Commencement date from October 1, 2004, to 
November 1, 2004, although the Lease Commencement Date did not change. 
45. Hunan waived its claims that RCC did not complete the 
Landlord's Work relating to restroom, electrical work, HVAC, water heater, T-
bar ceiling, underground plumbing and flooring and cannot recover under its 
counterclaim. 
R. 372-73. 
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The district court properly looked at the totality of the circumstances and the totality 
of the evidence presented, and reached the proper conclusion that Appellants waived all 
elements of their counterclaim. There is nothing inequitable about this conclusion. The 
district court did not enter any finding of fact that RCC somehow had unclean hands and was 
not deserving of the remedy of waiver. Rather, the findings are supported by copious 
evidence, and support the district court's conclusions that RCC acted in good faith. RCC 
relied on its general contractor and could have required its general contractor to perform any 
work that was determined to be less than what the lease called for. Hunan had the Premises 
inspected by its contractor within the first week of July, yet never submitted any punchlist 
or gave any indication that it thought RCC needed to do more work. Appellants cannot later 
claim at trial that Hunan's contractor should be paid by RCC for some of the work its 
contractor performed when Hunan never gave RCC notice of it, never gave RCC the 
opportunity to do the work, and then expressly claimed all Landlord's Work was completed. 
Therefore, the district court should be affirmed. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS' REQUEST TO 
AMEND THE COUNTERCLAIM 
Appellants next argue that the district court erred by denying their request to amend 
their Counterclaim. Under these circumstances, it was a proper exercise of the district 
court's discretion to deny the Motion to Amend. The standard of review is to determine 
whether the district court abused its discretion. See Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty 
West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Utah 1998) (stating that the Court "will affirm the 
denial unless the trial court abused its discretion"). 
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Appellants did not state any specific grounds for the Motion to Amend, but simply 
stated that it was consistent with the scheduling order. The mere fact that the Scheduling 
Order (R. 136-138) permits a party to make a motion to amend its pleadings is not, alone, 
sufficient grounds for allowing a such party to amend. Appellants were required to comply 
with the requirements of Rules 7 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which they did 
not do in this case. 
Rule 7 requires a moving party to state with "particularity" the "grounds for their relief 
sought." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). In Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,1(58; 48 P.3d 
895, the Utah Supreme Court explained why setting forth the grounds is important: 
Specifically, Rule 7(b)(1) requires the grounds for a motion for leave to amend 
to be stated particularly and with an attached proposed amended pleading so that 
the court can ascertain what changes are sought and can determine whether the 
motion should be granted and whether justice so requires the amendment of a 
pleading. 
The Court went on to affirm the lower court's decision to not allow amendment, stating: 
Further, Holmes's request failed to "state with particularity the grounds" upon 
which it based its motion for leave to amend. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). Holmes 
merely cited rule 15(a) and noted that leave to amend should be freely given. 
Holmes never articulated a single reason why the trial court should have 
granted it leave to amend . . . . 
Id. at [^59 (emphasis added). 
In their Motion to Amend,1 Appellants failed to set forth, with particularity, a single 
reason why the Motion to Amend should have been granted. Just as the litigant in Holmes 
1
 No supporting memorandum was filed with the Motion to Amend, and the Motion to 
Amend itself contained just two sentences in stating why the Motion to Amend should be 
granted: consistent with the Scheduling Order and Rule 15(a) URCP; and that justice so 
requires. (R.156) 
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merely cited the rule, Hunan merely stated a legal conclusion that "justice so requires" an 
amendment to the pleadings, without articulating a single reason to support the conclusion. 
The Holmes court set forth three required elements to a motion to amend: (1) bringing a 
separate identifiable motion; (2) setting forth with particularity grounds for the relief sought; 
and (3) attaching the proposed amended pleading. A failure in any one of these elements is 
fatal to the request to amend. In the case at hand, Appellants failed to set forth the grounds 
for relief, and it was proper for the district court to deny the Motion to Amend. 
Appellants now challenge the district court's ruling by relying on many unverified 
allegations that are not supported by the Findings. Appellants have not challenged the 
Findings. Therefore, such spurious allegations should be ignored. In addition to relying on 
unverified allegations, Appellants ignore the procedural setting of the Motion to Amend. By 
August 12, 2005, RCC had filed its opposition to the Motion to Amend. At this point, the 
parties still had until September 30,2005, to complete discovery. (R.137). After letting the 
Motion to Amend sit for five months, on January 17,2006, Appellants finally filed a request 
to submit the Motion to Amend to the district court for decision. (R. 182). On December 8, 
2005, approximately six weeks earlier, the district court had already conducted its final 
pretrial conference and set a trial date. Appellants did not raise this issue to the district court 
at the time of the final pretrial conference. In fact, neither Appellants nor their counsel even 
attended the pretrial conference. Given this procedural posture (the case was about to go to 
trial), and given the five-month delay in submitting the matter to the court for decision, the 
district court had every reason to deny the Motion to Amend. 
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Contrary to Appellants' very short description of why the district court denied the 
Motion to Amend, the district court enumerated seven different reasons supporting its 
conclusion that the Motion to Amend should be denied, including the following: 
1. Appellants did not, with particularity, provide grounds for the relief 
sought; 
2. Appellants had not conducted any discovery to show any new facts or 
evidence that would require an amendment; 
3. Appellants waited approximately six weeks after the pretrial conference 
to submit the motion for decision by the district court; 
4. At oral argument, Appellants did not provide any reason for the delay in 
bringing their Motion to Amend to the district court for ruling, but argued 
that it should be treated as a motion to amend to conform to the evidence 
at trial, which is an improper analysis; 
5. That allegations Appellants tried to admit as fact at oral argument were 
not supported by affidavit; 
6. That the claims Appellants proposed amended complaint were not based 
on newly discovered facts brought out by Appellants discovery, as 
Appellants did not conduct any discovery in the case; and 
7. That because of the delay in bringing it to the court for decision, it should 
not be considered timely filed. 
(R.255-258). On appeal, Appellants address only the last of those reasons—whether the 
Motion to Amend should be considered timely filed—and, accordingly, fail to show how the 
district court abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Amend. 
VI. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED RCC'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The Lease specifically provides that the prevailing party is entitled to recover its 
reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses in any dispute. Utah's unlawful detainer 
statute in effect at the time of trial mandates that attorneys' fees be included in the judgment, 
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stating "[t]he judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times 
the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for 
reasonable attorneys9 fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement/' Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-6-811 (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3)) (emphasis added).2 
The Utah Code in effect at the time of trial mandated that the judgment include an award of 
attorneys' fees if attorneys' fees are provided for in the lease. Because the Lease in this case 
provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees, the district court was required to enter such an 
award in addition to any other damages, including treble damages. 
However, even without the unique attributes regarding the award of attorneys' fees as 
bestowed by the unlawful detainer statute, Utah case law requires an award of attorneys' fees 
when they are provided for in the underlying contract. In Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court relied on several Utah cases to conclude that, when fees are 
allowed by contract, then they must be awarded as matter of legal right. This holding was 
after an analysis of whether a district court, in the face of a contract requiring an award of 
fees, "can exercise its discretion to make no award of fees." Id. at 836. The Cobabe decision 
was later followed in Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Saunders 
court agreed that attorneys' fees, when provided for by contract, should be awarded as a 
matter of legal right and stated that "if reasonable fees are recoverable by statute or contract, 
it is a mistake of law to award less than that amount." Id. at 579 (emphasis added). 
2
 This section was amended in 2007 to remove the requirement that attorneys' fees be 
provided for in the lease in order to be awarded in the judgment, and to expand the scope of 
damages which could be trebled. 
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The district court was, at first, silent in its findings and conclusions regarding any 
reason to not award attorneys' fees to RCC, which would be reversible error. See Findings, 
at 36 % 51; see also Myrah v. Campbell, 2007 UT App 168, ^ [36. RCC pointed this out in its 
memoranda supporting its Rule 52 Motion to Amend. In response, the district court, in 
denying RCC's Rule 52 Motion to Amend, relied on A.K. & R Whipple Plumbing and 
Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, %\2, 47 P.3d 92, which states that "courts have, in 
extraordinary situations, declined to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in spite of an 
enforceable contractual provision." A copy of the district court's "Order Denying Plaintiffs 
Rule 52 Motion to Amend" is included behind Tab 2 in the Addendum to this brief. 
In relying on Whipple, the district court determined that the case at hand was 
"extraordinary," in that: (i) RCC "has been awarded a substantial judgment, including treble 
damages, and a further award is not merited under the facts of this case"; (ii) Appellants were 
"legally barred from recovering on their tenant improvements" claims; and, (iii) Appellants 
"raised a number of real and substantial issues that the Court considered carefully in its 
ruling." (R. 402). 
These reasons do not rise to the level of the "extraordinary" circumstances 
contemplated under Utah law. There is nothing extraordinary about a party raising 
substantial issues at trial that cause careful consideration prior to having a court rule against 
such arguments. Nor is it extraordinary that a landlord could be entitled to a significant 
judgment when treble damages are included. The issue of extraordinary circumstances was 
reviewed in one of the footnotes in Cobabe. The Cobabe court noted that, in two non-Utah 
cases, courts had determined that refusing generous settlement offers in one case and 
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improper actions by both parties in the other case could result in a refusal to award attorney 
fees. Cobabe, 780 P.2dat 836 fn. 3. Neither of these reasons is present here. 
The Cobabe court referred to one Utah case, Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 
1976), as showing when attorneys' fees could be refused for "extraordinary" circumstances. 
In Fullmer, the plaintiff did not prevail on one of its primary claims. Specifically, the 
Fullmer court first noted that "it is significant that the trial courtfound against the plaintiffs' 
contention on one of the main issues in holding that the assignment to defendant [] was not 
fraudulent, but was bona fide." Id. at 610 (emphasis added). That this circumstance of not 
prevailing on a main issue is considered to be extraordinary is highlighted in a later case, 
stating "where particular complicated circumstances of the suit which involved principles of 
equity, as well as the fact that on a main issue the court had found against the party 
seeking attorney's fees, both entered in the court's denial of an attorney's fee." Jenkins 
v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, the district court ruled in favor of RCC on each and every one of 
RCC's claims and positions. Furthermore, the district court rejected every one of Appellants' 
claims and defenses as well. In its ruling, the district court did not find any improper conduct 
by RCC, or that it refused any generous settlement offers. The district court's only reasons 
were that RCC's award was already large enough and that it was a tough case to decide 
because of the substantial issues raised. 
Although there may be extraordinary circumstances where a court might, as a matter 
of law, be permitted to rewrite the contract between the parties and disregard the clause 
regarding the award of attorney's fees, such situations are highly unusual. The case at hand 
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does not present such a situation. Therefore, the Court should reverse the district court's 
denial of RCC's Rule 52 Motion to Amend and remand for a determination of RCC's 
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, including those incurred on appeal. See Cobabe, 780 
P.2d at 837 (an award of attorneys' fees includes appeals). 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's findings and conclusions should 
be affirmed in their entirety, with one exception: the district court's decision to deny RCC 
recovery of its attorneys' fees should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this jH day of September, 2008. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Bv: R q ^ f e c A t?H$ 
Jntf Russell S/Mitchell 
v Attorneys for Fjlaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j/s day of September, 2008,1 caused to be sent, via 
hand-delivery, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT to the following: 
Russell S. Walker 
David R. Williams 
WOODBURY & KESLER 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3358 
feoC 
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(3/10/2005 14:39 FAX 8183467400 
-> PROMENADE ©001 
AGREEMENT REGARDING RENT COMMENCEMENT DATE AND 
LANDLORD WORK UNDER LEASE DATED OCTOBER 22ND,2003 
RED CLIFFS CORNER, LLC, A Utah limited LiabiKty Craipany ("LaIldlo^l,,), 
and JJ HUNAN, INC., a Utah Coiporation, dba J J Hunan Sum Fun Food 
('Tenant"), in consideration of the mutual promises set forth herein, the sufficiency of 
which is hereby acknowledged, hereby agree that the Lease Agreement ("Lease") 
dated October 22*, 20<B, executed on November 21*, 2003, by Tenant, and executed 
November 26*, 2003 > by Landlord, be modified as to the Commencement Date and 
Landlord's Wo* as follows: 
L The Commencement Date under the Lease regarding when rent shall 
commence shall be modified from October 1*, 2004, to November 1*, 2004. 
Z Tenant agrees that the only remaining Landlord's Work is as follows: 
a- Modify HVAC units to provide 10 ton HVAC; 
b. Charge the HVAC and fill with Freononce Tenant has power hooked up; 
c Repair small roof leak coming from duct w oik; and 
d. Obtain acceptable response from Watts Construction regarding a cut 
through the top {date. 
3. Tenant agrees that, other than the items iu paragraph 2 above, all of the 
Landlord's Work is completed, and Tenant accepts die Premises as is and 
waives any and all claims for further Landlord's Weak under the Lease* 
This agreement is entered into as of this 29* day of October, 2004. 
TENANT: 
JJ HUNAN, Inc. 
A Utah Corporation, 
dba JJ HUNAN SUM] 
LANDLORD: 
RED CLIFFS CORNER, LLC 
A Utah limited liability Company 
by DAYSTAR DEVELOPMENT, INC, 
its Managing 1 
U 
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Tab 2 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 2007 JUL I 7 AM 5" 08 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RED CLIFFS CORNER, L.L.C., 
a Utah limited liability company, 
I ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
Plaintiff, RULE 52 MOTION TO AMEND 
vs. J 
J.J. HUNAN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
dba J.J. HUNAN SUM FUN FOOD, Case No. 050500538 
and R. ALAN KNOX, an individual, 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Defendants. 
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Plaintiff requests its attorneys fees; the Court previously ordered the parties 
to bear their own fees and costs. Defendant opposes the motion and has asked for relief on other 
matters. Having considered the motion and the memoranda submitted by both parties, the Court 
denies the motion. 
Plaintiff has been awarded a substantial judgment, including treble damages, and a further 
award is not merited under the facts of this case. Moreover, while the Court ultimately found 
defendants were legally barred from recovering on their tenant improvements, defendants raised 
a number of real and substantial issues that the Court considered carefully in its ruling. As the 
Court of Appeals has noted,"courts have, in extraordinary situations, declined to award attorney 
fees to a prevailing party in spite of an enforceable contractual provision." A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, % 12 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). 
U.M i 
Accordingly, the Court declines to award attorney's fees at this time. 
The Court has not seen the proposed judgment at this time and so does not here rule on 
defendants' objections to plaintiffs proposal. 
Dated this day of July, 2007. 
BY THECOURT: 
JUDGE ERIC A. LUDLOW 
Fifth District Court 
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I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
_ day of July, 2007,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, and/or caused to be delivered via folder in the Clerk's Office of the Fifth District Court, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
to: 
Russell S. Mitchell, Esq. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Russell S. Walker, Esq. 
David R. Williams, Esq. 
Woodbury & Kesler, P.C. 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358 
Clerk, Fifth District Cou 
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